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RECALLING T.R. POWELL'S COURSE 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Victor H. Kramer* 
After accepting the preceding article by Professor Braemer for 
publication, we learned that a colleague of ours had been a student of 
Powell's. He graciously agreed to share his memories of Powell's 
c/asses.-The Editors 
In my senior year at Harvard College (1934-35) I audited Pro-
fessor Thomas Reed Powell's third-year course in Constitutional 
Law given in Austin Hall at the Law School. There were approxi-
mately 150 to 200 law students in the class which met twice a week 
for both semesters. I was not formally enrolled as an auditor but 
simply sat in on almost all the classes. No one questioned my pres-
ence. I do not recall that any other undergraduates audited the 
course that year. 
Professor Powell, then fifty-five years old, sat at his desk in the 
middle of the teacher's platform, wearing horn-rimmed glasses and 
looking somewhat owl-like. Virtually all the talking in the class 
consisted of a dialogue between Professor Powell and two third-year 
students. One of these students became a clerk to Justice Frank-
furter and ultimately a famous liberal Washington lawyer. His 
name was Joseph Raub. The other student in 1950 was appointed 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. He 
had a distinguished name: it was Cornelius Wickersham, Jr. Wick-
ersham's views as a student of constitutional law were as far to the 
right as Raub's views were to the left. The fact that Raub had a 
sparkling sense of humor and that Wickersham did not, contributed 
to the fascinating, not to say exciting quality of many of the class-
room discussions. Powell seized on the preconceptions, tempera-
ments and high intelligence of these two students and called on 
them to answer his questions so that each student's views played off 
against the other's. In this manner, Powell revealed the major 
premises of constitutional law that were prevalent at the time. 
It was a joy even for a non-law student to attend these classes 
in this year-long course when Powell's flashing, cynical witticisms 
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punctuated his trialogue with Rauh and Wickersham. This was the 
era in which some legislatures required teachers to take an oath to 
support the Constitution and some teachers attacked the legislation 
as unconstitutional. Powell cracked: "I have no objection to taking 
an oath to support the Constitution; after all, it has supported me 
all my life." 
But to the contemporary law professor, the most remarkable 
aspect of Powell's course was that it covered only the commerce 
clause and some aspects of the due process clauses. I do not recall 
that the class overtly discussed any other part of constitutional law. 
Moreover, the discussion centered around only one or two cases: 
Hammer v. Dagenhart', and (much more briefly) Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital.2 If a student in the class learned about the substan-
tive aspects of any other part of constitutional law, he (there were 
no women at Harvard Law at that time) would have had to read the 
book assigned for the course on his own. That book was compiled 
by Professor James Parker Hall, Dean of the University of Chicago 
Law School. The book was in the American Casebook Series and 
covered almost 1900 pages. Students used the 1913 edition enlarged 
by a 1926 Supplement bound into the 1913 edition. (Constitutional 
law was slower to change in those days.) The two cases on which 
Powell dwelt were in the Supplement. It is interesting that, with 
regard to Adkins v. Children's Hospital (decided in 1923), Professor 
Hall suggested that it be considered immediately following the fa-
mous Lochner case3 (decided in 1905) while Hammer v. Dagenhart 
(decided in 1918) should be taken up right after McCray v. United 
States,4 decided in 1904 and long since forgotten. 
I cannot explain how the sixty hours in that course slid by 
when only two cases were considered in depth. But the Powell 
method of speaking can be described. He had a rapier-like thrust of 
mind, exhibited sometimes in long, rolling, Macauley-like sentences 
and sometimes in the form of phrases meant to pierce the pontifica-
tion in a Court opinion. One example from his writings conveys the 
essence. It is from an address given to the North Carolina Bar As-
sociations in August 1935, about three months after the end of the 
class, and concerns a small portion of Mr. Justice Roberts's opinion 
in the Railway Pension case. 6 
1. 247 u.s. 251 (1918). 
2. 261 u.s. 525 (1923). 
3. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
4. 195 u.s. 27 (1904). 
5. Powell, Some Aspects of Constitutionalism and Federalism, 14 N.C.L. REV. I 
(1935). 
6. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
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"Our duty, like that of the court below, is fairly to construe the powers of 
Congress, and to ascertain whether or not the enactment falls within them, uninflu-
enced by predilection for or against the policy disclosed in the legislation. The fact 
that the compulsory scheme is novel is, of course, no evidence of unconstitutional-
ity. Even should we consider the Act unwise and prejudicial to both public and 
private interest, if it be fairly within delegated power our obligation is to sustain it. 
On the other hand, though we should think the measure embodies a valuable social 
plan and be in entire sympathy with its purpose and intended results, if the provi-
sions go beyond the boundaries of constitutional power we must so declare. 7 .. 
Behold these nine automatons, with minds swept free of every human frailty 
and every human preference, with no interest in the income of carriers or the well-
being of those whose hands are on the throttle and whose eyes are on the track, with 
no notions of public policy, behold them reading the Constitution with some 
mechanical instruments of vision and of understanding and finding there between 
the lines or beneath the words of 1787 and 1789 the answers to the questions of 
1935!8 
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You did not come away from Powell's course with any system 
of values for deciding constitutional questions. Indeed, Frankfurter 
has said that Powell often told him that he (Frankfurter) furnished 
the students' minds after Powell cleared them of rubbish.9 And so, 
week after week of engaging Raub and Wickersham in debate al-
lowed Powell to destroy the premises and lack of logic in virtually 
every sentence of the two opinions on which he concentrated. 
Joe Raub has since told me that he recalls Powell had pre-
dicted that the Supreme Court was going to uphold the constitu-
tionality of the NRA in the Schechter case. On May 27, 1935, the 
Court decided that the NRA was unconstitutional.w That was 
either the day before or the day after the final exam in the course 
but today neither of us recalls which it was. 
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